24 September 2022, Saturday, 13:51 1574

Putin fires another commander in Ukraine, decides to personally move troops – CNN

Редактор: Roman Vaniyan

There is a split in the Russian military leadership - the military commanders do not know how to react to the successful offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). It is aggravated by the fact that President Putin directly tries to command the generals who are on the front lines.

This was reported by CNN with reference to numerous sources familiar with U.S. intelligence data.

According to intercepted conversations of Russian officers, they argue with each other and complain to family and friends at home about how decisions are made in Moscow and how they try to command them from there, one of the sources told CNN.

The leadership of the Russian army has not been able to organize an effective command of the operation in Ukraine since the invasion itself. In late March, sources told CNN that the U.S. military could not even determine whether the group had a single commander in charge of the operation.

The British newspapers The Times and The Guardian wrote back in May that Putin personally gives orders to the active troops. As Western militaries told them, after the army's failures in the initial phase of the war, Putin decided to take command into his own hands, even making operational and tactical decisions that normally fall under the purview of a "colonel or brigadier general."

The practice continues, according to two CNN sources familiar with U.S. and other Western intelligence. Putin is now giving orders to generals in the army, the agency reports:

"In the modern army, this is an extremely unusual management tactic, which, according to these sources, indicates the inefficiency of Russian command structures, which has haunted Russian troops since the beginning of the war."

Such behavior of the president can be explained by the fact that he, as a KGB employee, was used to conducting special operations and was not ready to hand over the reins of power to the military.

"His entire background as a member of the special services pushed him to choose a 'special operation' rather than war," writes Oleksandr Baunov, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Foundation.

The invasion of Ukraine was not calculated for years, notes Baunov: "We see that in various situations Putin thinks precisely in the scope of special operations, which are usually calculated for a maximum of several months. ...There is no doubt that the terms of the invasion of Ukraine were calculated in a similar way."

On September 11, the press center of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine announced that after the crushing defeat of Russian troops in the Kharkiv Region, the commander of the western group of the Russian Armed Forces, Roman Berdnikov, was removed from his post. A NATO representative confirmed this information to CNN, noting that the commander lasted only 15 days. This is not the first change in leadership positions, and it further increases the disorder in the command structures of the Russian troops, the sources of the agency note.

Among the leaders of the Russian army, there are significant differences in the issues of further strategy. They can't agree on where to put the most effort to strengthen defenses, multiple sources familiar with U.S. intelligence said.

An example of such a difference of opinion can be the notification of the Ministry of Defense of Russia about the transfer of units to the Kharkiv direction, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine achieved the greatest success during the counteroffensive. However, only a "small number" of servicemen were sent there, two Pentagon officials said. According to a high-ranking military official, the "insignificant scale" of the redeployment indicates an inability to conduct serious operations.

The main forces, as before, remain in the south, where the Ukrainians continue their offensive in the Kherson Region, military sources in the U.S. and other Western countries tell CNN.

In such a situation, according to Western military officials, the mobilization announced in Russia will not help it to plug the holes at the front. It will not be possible to quickly form combat-ready units from reservists, but problems related to command, supply, communication and morale remain.

Unlike modern Western military structures, in Russia, there is no system of regular training and training of reservists, organized maintenance of military equipment stored in warehouses, there are no strong ties between reservists and units of the active army, according to retired American admiral James G. Stavridis, former the supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe: "This shows that Russia does not have a large-scale organized reserve to which the army could turn."