A short while ago, we bore witness to an epic scandal unfurling. The head of "Ukrposhta," Igor Smeliansky, faced penalties from the National Bank for non-disclosure of financial statements. The financial regulator once more thwarted the postal service's aspirations to establish its own banking entity. In this conflict, the chief of "Ukrposhta" is evidently misguided. Undoubtedly, his organization falls short of the bank ownership criteria, teetering on the brink of insolvency chronically. Hence, the National Bank's stance is justified.
Nevertheless, one episode in Smeliansky's statements undeniably commands attention. The head of "Ukrposhta" accused the NBU of double standards and selective oversight. According to him, there exist banks where the regulator turns a blind eye to violations.
I am unsure which bank he referred to specifically. If I were in Smeliansky'sshoes, I would cast a spotlight on the state-owned "Sense Bank." This narrative delves into how under the guise of the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the President, and two independent supervisory boards, banal abuses unfolded, a saga reminiscent of the Yanukovych era rather than contemporary Ukraine. For the first time, I will not only cite the familiar facts brought to light by the Verkhovna Rada's TSC but also some insights from the National Bank's inspections.
There are three compelling reasons why these revelations demand amplification.
Firstly, state-owned "Sense" and "Ukrgaz" are viewed as candidates for strategic investor sales. In the March 2024 Memorandum with the IMF, it was stipulated that Ukraine must prepare for the sale of precisely "Sense Bank" and "Ukrgazbank" through a transparent process and the selection of an international financial consultant.
The consultant selection competition was announced on 31st March 2026. Applications are accepted until 15th June 2026. The same company will oversee the preparation of both banks, likely reaping millions from Ukraine for this service.
In my opinion, prospective buyers deserve to acquaint themselves with the true state of affairs at "Sense." They should not purchase a pig in a poke.
Secondly, the existence of schemes suggests that in truth, "Sense Bank" is not intended for sale at all. Presently, it is highly conducive to conducting illicit operations and plausibly generating "shadow" incomes for a cohort close to power. A similar scenario unfolded with the state-owned "Oschad" and "Exim," where rampant abuses nearly led to their liquidation. This is corruption in its classical form.
Note: as per the Ministry of Finance's conditions, the consultant will prepare the bank for sale by 1st March 2029 (practically "never"). There are grounds to believe that the contract will be awarded to the incumbent favorite of the Ministry of Finance - Rothschild, who assisted in restructuring Yaresko's ventures. Whether it is Rothschild or not, the consultant's real task may entail simulating vigorous activity while preserving the status quo in actuality. Readers ought not to harbor illusions regarding the genuine motives of Ukrainian authorities.
Thirdly, this serves the public interest as "Sense" is a state-owned bank. Therefore, it could potentially incur losses for the state. Presently, the official authorities feign as if nothing detrimental is unfolding with the bank. However, this is far from the truth. There exists a group of vested individuals desiring the bank's operations to remain veiled in secrecy, despite the violations.
EPISODE 0. THE INCEPTION OF SCHEMES
On July 21, 2023, "Sense Bank" was nationalized. Shortly thereafter, rumors circulated within political and financial spheres suggesting an effort to mold "Sense" into a covert power structure, to wield financial machinations through it. This proposition struck an odd chord. When a bank falls under state ownership, one would anticipate adherence to legality, regulations, and transparency. Perhaps this is the custom in Europe - but not in Ukraine. In the case of "Sense Bank," everything unfolded along the worst-case scenario.
Even before nationalization, there were whispers that "Sense" had accumulated a substantial amount of cash, which in itself was an intriguing asset for various schemers. Post-nationalization, other discussions ensued. Officially, the authorities spoke of attempts by former owners to withdraw a significant sum from the bank. What transpired in reality remains unknown.
Externally, chaos in management was visibly apparent. The state struggled to find a willing candidate to lead the bank for an extended period, which in itself was peculiar - considering that "Sense" had always been among the top three banks in Ukraine for management quality. The first temporary chairman, Dmytro Kuzmin, resigned just half a month after appointment, citing health reasons officially. However, sources close to the Banking sector claimed that the new chairman was compelled to follow directives from a shadowy "back office." Specifically, the banker had to sign documents related to the distribution of the bank's funds.
Before long, the first supervisory board was elected, led by a veteran in this field, Shevki Adjuner. He had previously chaired supervisory boards at "Ukrzaliznytsia" and other state monopolies, renowned for his ability not to sweep problems under the rug. A new board of directors also emerged, soon linked with the so-called "shadow office."
EPISODE 1. "SENSE BANK" SHARPENED FOR THE GAMBLING MARKET
The appointment of a permanent supervisory board and a new management did not rectify the situation. Sources within the government and the business sector revealed that the bank was being tailored to serve the needs of the gambling market, particularly the "shadow" segment. Why? Because "Sense Bank" had long been considered one of the leaders in the Ukrainian market for banking cards.
By following this link, you will find some information on how the gambling market looked before "Sense" became the de facto monopoly in servicing "gambling activities." Several banks operated in that market, with the state-owned "Ukrgaz" overseeing 50-70% of the transactions. As a final touch, I will add the fact that "Ukrgaz" was considered "minfinivsky" since its nationalization. In financial circles, this meant that management was largely controlled by the clerks of the Ministry of Finance (for comparison, "Privat" was considered.
To eliminate competitors in the gambling sector, a scandal surrounding the so-called "misdigning" was artificially inflated. As a result, former leaders such as "Ukrgaz," IBOX, and "Concord" were ousted from the gambling market.
Their place was indeed taken by "Sense." A year had elapsed since the nationalization, and Sense Bank was already being depicted in articles as a bank that catered to a significant portion of the lawful gambling business and acted as an acquirer for the majority of players. All this outwardly appeared as the legalization of the gambling market, were it not for one caveat. The "shadow" segment of the market had not vanished.
Various studies conducted in the years 2024-2025 indicate that the illicit segment of the gambling market constituted between 39% and 53% of the market. In monetary terms, this equated to 37–66 billion UAH annually. There are reasons to believe that these figures are significantly underestimated.
Legal market players frequently assert that the state does not effectively combat illicit operators, shifting a heavier financial burden onto compliant operators. This is indeed the case. However, as we shall discover later on, even legal players are implicated in dubious schemes.
Who presently services these financial streams? I am unaware. However, following the eradication of competitors, there has been much discourse regarding the augmented role of the state-owned "Sense Bank" and, to a lesser extent, "Oschadbank".
There are ample grounds to consider that the absence of combating the illicit gaming market is a facet of the "state policy" in Ukraine. Specifically, the legislative framework of the market was consciously devised to retain "loopholes" that enable "shadow operators" to launder vast sums of money. One of these "loopholes" is the deficiency of an online monitoring system, slated to be introduced only in July 2026, despite discussions dating back to the early 2000s.
It is worth mentioning that the authors of the current market architecture were Members of Parliament who have been systematically criticizing the "igorka" for many years - Danilo Hetmantsev and Yaroslav Zheleznyak. Therefore, reality significantly diverges from the official narrative they propagate.
Those were far from the only rumors circulating around "Sense Bank". Apart from gambling, there were whispers of issuing opaque loans and illicit cash transactions. The bank itself and the authorities vehemently denied everything until the year 2025 dawned.
EPISODE 2. MEETING OF THE TEMPORARY INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION (TIC)
The first validation of rumors came in the form of a fine imposed on "Sense" by the National Bank in April 2025, a full two years post-nationalization. The regulator compelled the bank to pay 4.1 million UAH for inadequate combatting of money laundering and terrorism financing. It is not surprising, considering that the largest bank in the gambling market (rumoredly) serviced, among others, "shadow" transactions.
In the following six months, the bank struggled against accusations that emerged both in the investigations of "Ukrainska Pravda" and in the statements of the Member of Parliament Yaroslav Zheleznyak. They were already unraveling a scandal, later known as the "Midas affair". Facts such as the appointment of a "caretaker" named Vasyl Vesely (who had no prior financial experience), the existence of Timur Mindich's gambling business, "schemes" involving "Energoatom", and much more had already been disclosed. Naturally, the bank claimed to operate strictly within the confines of the law and denied the existence of such activities. However, trust in its statements had already waned.
In November 2025, a well-known five-hour session of the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Verkhovna Rada on the damage to Ukraine's economic security, better known as the "Zheleznyak TIC", took place. During the meeting, the head of the TIC, Yaroslav Zheleznyak, identified "Sense Bank" as a key conduit for gambling and potential corrupt schemes with "Energoatom".
The situation had taken a serious turn. Representatives from the NABU and the SAP present at the meeting explicitly mentioned "Sensе Bank" in the context of investigating the activities of Timur Mindich's and Oleksandr Muzhel's "back office." They confirmed that key decisions in the bank were not made by the supervisory board or the management, but by an external "back office." This "back office" had direct ties to Rostyslav Shurma and Timur Mindich, and in reality, to the then-head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak. Anti-corruption bodies viewed the bank as one of the venues through which financial flows of criminal organizations could pass.
In particular, the head of the SAP, Oleksandr Klymenko, noted that funds "laundered" through the shadow office were distributed across accounts in various banks, including overseas. Discussions in the "back office" included the allocation of a $20 million loan by "Sense Bank" to Oleksandr Muzhel and an individual by the name of Prisyazhnyuk, who was already implicated in a NABU case linked to the former head of the State Property Fund, Dmytro Sennichenko.
Another accusation by the TIC pertained to the alleged cash outflow from the bank - the so-called "blue dollars." According to Zheleznyak, this cash was tied to corruption within "Energoatom". Naturally, the executives of "Sense" vehemently denied all allegations.
Perhaps, the scandal was quelled by the Minister of Finance, SerhiyMarchenko. The Minister proposed a hypothesis that any information casting aspersions on the bank could be utilized to undermine trust in the state governance in Ukraine, especially in the context of arbitration from the bank's former proprietors. It will not be long before it becomes apparent that this hypothesis is highly convenient, as it enables one to effortlessly evade challenges by simply pretending that everything is in order.
STRANGE COINCIDENCE
Another media bombshell detonated, only to dissipate suddenly. It may appear peculiar, but the Temporary Investigative Commission ( TIC) yielded no tangible impact. Law enforcement authorities refrained from initiating any new cases in response.
Furthermore, the TIC report made no allusion to "Sense". While the document does acknowledge that 54 billion UAH annually are being laundered through banks (utilizing 'miskoding' and P2P), conspicuously absent is any mention of the notorious scandal. Here are the references to the reports of both TIC, headed at that time by Yaroslav Yeletsky. Both appear to be lacking in substance, devoid of specific names and designations.
The report was disregarded, suggesting a deliberate act of ignorance.
Several details related to the work of the investigatory commission caught my attention.
Firstly, the conduct of the Minister of Finance.
During the TIC meeting, Serhiy Marchenko testified regarding the management of state assets, including "Sense Bank" and "Energoatom". The Minister of Finance denied that the appointments at the bank were influenced by the figures of "Mindich tapes" or Rostyslav Shurma. Marchenko insisted that the ministry operated solely through official mechanisms of corporate governance and did not possess information on the activities of the "back offices".
This brought upon him a barrage of criticism from the side of Zheliezniak.
and his colleagues. Indeed, could Marchenko have been unaware of the schemes? This seems improbable, as the Ministry of Finance represents the state in the management of state-owned banks, participates in the appointment of supervisory boards, and even has a specialized department for overseeing state-owned banks.
According to Zheliezniak, "the back office of Mindich distributes positions," deciding to "grant a $20 million credit to Mujely and Prisyazhnyuk." Zheliezniakconfirmed that the persona of Vasyl Vesely was identified not only by MykhailoTkach's investigation (Ukrainska Pravda) but also by the TIC documents, which designate him as the "caretaker" of "Sense Bank".
"Are we absolutely fine with the state governance of state-owned banks? Have I mixed up anything?" questioned the head of TIC to Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko.
Interestingly, Marchenko responded evasively, and - there were no consequences.
Secondly, there were no consequences for the chairman of the board of "Sense Bank," Oleksiy Stupak.
It seems as though the commission accepted his words: "Vasyl Vesely was an advisor to the previous supervisory board. When the mandate of the previous supervisory board expired, Vasyl Vesely's authority ceased." When Zheliezniakargued that Vesely was still present in the office of "Sense Bank," Stupak replied that Vesely had not been at the office of "Sense Bank" since losing his authority. The work of TIC simply came to a halt, and Stupak remained in his position.
This is also remarkable. Indeed, following the scandalous revelation in "Ukrainska Pravda", Vasil Veselyi did resign from the bank. However, his long-time business partner, Mykola Gladyschenko (who managed the LLC "Vel MitInvest", founded by Veselyi), took over from Veselyi. He was appointed as the head of the supervisory board of "Sense". Now, the influence has transitioned from informal to entirely tangible.
Could Stupak have been unaware of this?
Zhelyeznyak also noted that the bank's cash collection is handled by the company CIT, registered at the same address as Timur Mindich's factory. Stupak replied that the company selection process went through a competition. And - that was it.
This issue concluded, which in itself is strange given the resonance of the case. It's as if a directive was received not to pursue the matter further.
Personally, I am left with the impression that the essence of the TIC's work lay precisely in the media scandal.
No one seemed inclined to set things in order at "Sense Bank". All necessary changes had already taken place at the moment when the leadership of the Ministry of Energy and "Energoatom" changed.
EPISODE 3. NATIONAL BANK INSPECTION
I have previously indicated that the TIC report by Zheleznyak never mentions "Sense Bank," although all logic points directly to it. The TSC document resembles more of a general theme abstract, lacking any specifics. The report contains general data confirming large-scale tax evasion schemes in the gambling business and banking manipulations, including "miskoding," P2P transactions, and mass opening of accounts for a single client. However, devoid of surnames and titles.
Quite another matter is the official document from the National Bank. Based on the results of 2025, the NBU conducted an inspection of "Sense Bank." What the TSC discussed in general was confirmed in detail. Moreover, according to my information, the bank received a fine of 30 million UAH from the regulator. Compared to other banks, this is a modest sum - sanctions of up to 180 million UAH can be imposed. The most recent known fine for "Sense" was recorded in 2024, and only amounted to 4.1 million UAH.
But here lies an important detail. This fine of 30 million UAH was not officially introduced, but rather framed as a voluntary transfer from the bank to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Perhaps, there exists an unwritten directive from higher authorities not to allow any scandals involving "Sense," and the NBU must adhere to this.
Allow me to share some facts that have come to my attention. Specifically, banking oversight specialists discovered a mass opening of accounts for a single individual to circumvent the current NBU restrictions on cash withdrawals. For instance, 18 accounts were opened for one person in two days, 73 for another in three days, and 152 current accounts for a third individual within half a year. Through these accounts, millions of hryvnias were withdrawn, after which the accounts were closed. The phenomenon was so widespread that in 2025, 30 billion UAH was withdrawn from the bank accounts, including 3.3 billion UAH with violations. There is a likelihood that these extensive cash schemes were implemented for purposes related to corruption surrounding "Energoatom."
Additionally, the NBU identified commissions charged to clients below cost. These clients refer to the largest operators in the gambling market.
For instance, "Sense Bank" established standard tariffs for internet acquiring for regular clients ranging from 1.7% to 2.2%. However, for specific companies, individual rates were set:
- For LLC "FAVBET," LLC "GAMEDEV," LLC "CASINO UA" - at 0.9% with a cost of 1.1%
- LLC "AP.MY Finance" - at 1% with a cost of 1.1%.
The bank itself explained that the reduced commissions were aimed at increasing client turnover. However, according to my information, the turnovers did not increase as anticipated. The bank simply did not generate the expected revenue.
Similarly, the bank lowered the rates for transferring funds from one card to another for specific operators. While the standard rate ranged from 0.5% to 1.5%, clients of LLC "FAVBET", LLC "GAMEDAY", and LLC "CASINO UA" were charged a rate of 0.35%. As a result, the state bank missed out on millions of hryvnias. This is documented in the NBU report.
All of this might seem like a routine management decision. The bank opted to reduce tariffs to drive up turnover. However, three crucial points need to be taken into consideration.
Firstly, according to the NBU directive, "Sense Bank" does not allocate profits to the budget but channels them towards recapitalization. The supervisory board and management have a clear priority - capital growth. Consequently, they are not authorized to forego profits. Lowering tariffs on an individual basis directly contradicts the rules.
Secondly, discounts make sense when a bank faces competition from other institutions. However, "Sense" stands as the de facto monopolist in the market for servicing gambling payments. It handles 80-85% of market turnovers by various estimates. Therefore, it is unlikely to require discounts. On the contrary, it could dictate the tariffs.
The third and most important point - as per my sources in financial circles, such operations do not indicate discounts but rather highlight illicit activities. It is believed that the reduced tariffs were implemented by the bank's leadership to pocket a portion of the income in cash. Taking all aspects of the "Midas case" into account, this version appears more plausible to me.
Now, let us envision the turnovers of "Sense Bank". The commission income from gambling constitutes 73% of all bank commission revenues. In monetary terms, gambling commissions amounted to 627 million hryvnias in 2023, slightly decreasing to 619 million hryvnias in 2024. Presumably, the commissions for 2025 were even higher. Therefore, one can only imagine the magnitude of cash transactions involved.
Additionally, note that approximately half of the gambling market operates unofficially. According to my sources, "Sense Bank" also caters to these streams. Their appearance in official documentation remains unknown to me. However, these payments likely do not pass as gambling-related commissions. Most likely, they fall under a practice known as "miskoding" – payments are processed under different categories.
Yet this is not the limit. Some legal intricacies are exceedingly challenging to clarify, especially considering the bank's state affiliation. Let me provide an example. In 2024, within a brief period (from July 10 to 23, 2024), three companies were established with the bank. All three were granted a considerably lower individual tariff than the bank's service costs (0.35% for card-to-card transfers and 0.9% for acquirings). As mentioned before, this could indicate that a portion of the income went to the bank's leadership and/or its overseers in cash. Two of these companies - LLC "BOOKMAKING COMPANY FAVBET" and LLC "CASINO.UA" - are owned by Andriy Matiush, who is accused of the ties to the Russian Federation. How so?
In the case of other banks, such violations could have led to hefty fines, management changes, or even license revocations. However, "Sens Bank" managed to easily navigate through the situation. All high-ranking supervisors in the gambling sector of "Sens Bank" retained their positions:
- Alexei Stupak - chairman of the bank's executive board.
- Inna Tiutiun – deputy chairman of the executive board, overseeing the gambling business.
- Marina Revutska – director of the bank's payment solutions department. The gambling business falls under her direct management.
According to my information, responsibility was attributed to Olga Artiukh– a staff member of the corporate sector, previously involved in energy companies. According to my sources, Stupak intended to dismiss her, but after influential individuals intervened, she remained in her position, with the addition of oversight of the gambling sector. Eventually, her dismissal did occur, following the regulator's inspection. The traditional decision was to pin the blame on a mid-level clerk. It is quite probable that the official reason for her dismissal is different. In essence, there are no issues concerning Ms. Artiukh. It is evident that she was not the main figure in this process.
The NBU documented the described violation facts in its report. However, no official conclusions were drawn. Furthermore, the fine was concealed. Therefore, it seems that following the latest inspection of "Senses Bank," nothing consequential was revealed.
Once again, suspicions arise that orders from higher authorities directed that no revelations unfold. Someone is evidently keen on portraying everything as normal, with no misdeeds occurring, especially nothing criminal. Servicing the gambling market continues as before, with minimal attention given.
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