Schengen: Freedom of Movement or Fragmented Control? Can the EU Withstand the Strain?

On 14 June 1985, aboard the Princesse Marie-Astrid, five signatories agreed on what is perhaps the most visible symbol of European integration – a space without internal borders. Over forty years, Schengen has endured three major stress tests: the migration–terrorism wave of 2015–2016, the 2020 pandemic, and the security consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine since 2022. Today, it is no longer only about passport control, but also about trust between states. This trust falters when “temporary” checks drag on for months or even years, and the central country of the zone, Germany, in 2025 abruptly changes the rules of the game. The question is simple: can Schengen withstand this turn, and what will be the price for the EU if it cannot?

I. How “Europe without borders” was built (1985–2014)

Schengen began both as a political gesture and as a technical project. The 1985 Agreement set the course, and the 1990 Convention provided the tools: harmonisation of visa policy, police and judicial cooperation, data exchange through SIS. In 1995, the mechanism came into practical operation, and in 1999, with the Amsterdam Treaty, it “moved” into the EU legal system. The logic was simple yet demanding: “the freer the internal movement, the stronger the external perimeter.”

Cracks appeared even before the “great migration”. In 2011, Lampedusa and the Tunisian route caused tensions between Italy and France, while Denmark experimented with checks on the border with Sweden and Germany. In 2013, the EU clarified the procedures for temporarily reinstating controls: allowed only as an exception, for a limited time, and with proven proportionality. On paper, this looked like a balance, but in practice it became a space – and in fact a precedent (albeit justified) – for future political manoeuvres.

Incidentally, it was already clear at the time: Schengen is not self-sufficient, but internally interdependent. It rests on three pillars: the security of the external border, rapid data exchange between member states, and mutual trust. If even one pillar is shaken, the entire structure suffers.

II. Where we are now (2015–2025): when “temporary” lingers

2015 was a watershed: the migration shock and terrorist attacks sharply increased the number of notifications on the reinstatement of internal controls. The second peak came in 2020, when the pandemic effectively “froze” the area. After COVID, the volume of notifications has gone down (in 2024 – a few dozen; in the first half of 2025 – even fewer), but the average duration of each period has noticeably increased. Implementation is concentrated in a narrow group of states – Austria, Germany, Norway, as well as France, Denmark, Finland. The conclusion is simple: the exception is being normalised, and the main parameter is no longer the frequency but the length of controls over time.

The Schengen Borders Code norm is “zero” checks within the zone. The exception (Art. 25–30): there is a serious threat to public order/security, necessarily temporary and proportionate, with prior notification to the Commission (reasons, geography, timeframes). The basic limit is up to 30 days, in total – up to 6 months (up to 2 years in exceptional cases). The Commission may express a position but has no right of veto: responsibility lies with governments, and control is political and judicial. The practical test is the justification and proportionality in time and space.

Germany: after the 2025 elections, Berlin’s tone became harsher. On 7 May, the Interior Ministry announced refusals of entry directly at the border line for persons without the right to enter, including some asylum seekers. Deployment of federal police was reinforced; on 7 August, the government confirmed that controls would continue beyond the September deadline. In parallel, deportations of convicted persons to Afghanistan were resumed, and a similar track regarding Syria is under discussion, causing legal risks and criticism from human rights defenders.

Courts are narrowing the space for “short” practices. An applicant for international protection cannot simply be “turned back at the barrier” – first there must be a procedure to determine the responsible state under the Dublin Regulation. Therefore, refusals at the border are possible only within clear legal frameworks – otherwise, losses in court are inevitable.

Poland responded with symmetrical checks on the borders with Germany and Lithuania. In Słubice/Frankfurt (Oder), tensions are rising, with “citizen patrols” recorded. In the west, Luxembourg’s long-standing dissatisfaction is growing: the Moselle Valley lives on “pendulum work”, and 50–55 thousand daily trips back and forth feel even a +15–20 minutes in the queue. In fact, where the benefits of Schengen are greatest, “temporary” barriers hurt the most.

By the way: the benchmark for delays at internal borders is +10–20 minutes for cars and +30–60 minutes for trucks. These are average values; in “narrow zones” like Grand Est, hours of waiting arise very quickly and easily.

France has extended internal controls until the end of October; Austria – until November; Slovenia maintains checks on its Croatian and Hungarian sections. At the same time, on 1 January 2025, Romania and Bulgaria abolished land borders: at the Danube Bridge, throughput capacity increased sharply; in the first quarter, traffic between the countries rose by about a quarter (from ~128 thousand to ~160 thousand vehicles), and the average waiting time at some crossings fell from over 10 hours to less than two. The absence of a barrier provides an instant gain in logistics.

A separate line – Gibraltar: the EU and the UK have politically agreed on a framework that effectively integrates the checkpoint into Schengen logic (two-tier checks at the port and airport). Legal finalisation is still ahead, but the trend is clear: political will makes borders “smarter”, not just “higher”.

Finally, digital modernisation: the Entry/Exit System (EES) will launch in autumn 2025 in phases, ETIAS – at the end of 2026. Both systems are designed to return checks to where they belong – at the external perimeter – and to remove unnecessary transaction costs inside.

III. What is at stake: the economy and citizen support

The “price of the queue” is not an abstraction but a daily loss of hours and money. Even the conservative estimates of 2016 – €5–18 billion annually in direct logistical costs and operational delays plus €10–20 billion in lost tourism revenue – show the scale of the problem. In the pessimistic model, it was up to €1.43 trillion over a decade. After the inflation waves of 2022–2024 and the war, these amounts are likely underestimated. The hardest hit – border agglomerations and transit corridors, where “fifteen minutes” turn into systemic downtime.

Border agglomerations are not statistics but the rhythm of life. In the Moselle Valley and the Rhine–Alsace hub, tens of thousands of people commute daily for work, study, or services. If we take just 50 thousand daily crossings and an average delay of 15 minutes on working days, we get about 2.75 million person-hours per year; at an assumed hourly value of €25, that is nearly €69 million of “burned time”. At 20 minutes’ average delay, the amount rises to €90+ million. For small businesses, this results in missed shifts, fines for delivery failures, loss of contractors, and the transfer of orders to less “nervous” regions.

Transit corridors show a similar picture, but in wholesale prices. On the Austrian–Slovenian and Austrian–Hungarian sections, critical for the Balkan and Italian routes, 45 minutes of downtime for 8 thousand trucks per day means about 2.19 million “truck-hours” per year. Even if we count downtime at €70/hour (the lower limit for international road transport including fuel, labour, and depreciation), that is over €150 million in direct costs annually – without considering cascade effects: increased working capital for warehousing, shifts in port schedules, and higher “last mile” costs.

New Schengen nodes demonstrate the mirror effect of “minus barrier – plus productivity”. On the Romanian–Bulgarian border, removing land control has already delivered a tangible increase in throughput and a drop in average delays from hours to minutes. But this saving is easily “eaten up” if stable internal barriers appear simultaneously in the centre of Europe: the gains of the periphery and the southeast are offset in central logistics hubs, which are actually much more important from the point of view of capital flows.

Citizens vote with their feet and in surveys: freedom of movement is consistently supported by about nine out of ten respondents; over 80% directly associate it with economic benefits – from access to jobs to shelf prices. The generation that grew up without passport control sees queues as an anachronism and a “fine” for political mistakes that allowed in some who exploit rather than those who contribute. This is where the issue of trust is decided: can the EU and national governments provide security without returning to the logic of barriers.

Mobility is the lubricant of the single market. Within Schengen, there are up to 1.25 billion trips annually; in “normal” mode, about 3.5 million people cross internal borders every day. These are not just tourists: they are commuters, students, patients, service professionals. When “permanent temporariness” of controls appears, it is not only carriers that suffer – it hits value chains, local labour markets, and political support for integration.

By the way, “soft” effects are easily underestimated. Even short delays undermine public transport schedules, make cross-border educational programmes less attractive, and reduce the frequency of cultural and business contacts. After a year of such small losses, behaviour patterns change: people change jobs, companies cut cross-border vacancies, universities reduce joint courses. Getting out of this inertia is always more expensive than prevention.

IV. Three trajectories to 2027

1. “A truly strengthened perimeter + digital gates” as the baseline necessary scenario. The logic is simple: invest in effective screening at the external border (EES/ETIAS, biometrics, pre-screening of visa-free travel), and internally return to the literal meaning of the exceptionality of internal checks. The European Commission “stitches in” transparency: a public scoreboard of all extensions with an explanatory note and proportionality assessment; regular peer-review missions; short deadlines for government responses. For Germany (after resolving key problems with AfD popularity, if possible) this means a shift towards systemic readmission agreements and joint return charters, targeted work on carrier networks, plus de-escalation with neighbours. Success indicators – months without internal extensions on main corridors, stable checkpoint passage times, reduced carrier costs. Political effect – narrowing the field for right-wing populists through tangible improvement in citizens’ daily experience and (!) security.
2. “Managed fragmentation”. Several key states (DE/AT/FR/NO) maintain long internal checks; most others – in zero mode. The Commission advises and monitors, but sanction “teeth” are minimal – a map of “pockets” of tension emerges. For Germany, this sustains the signal “we control the border” for the domestic voter; courts gradually cut back the most contentious practices; neighbours respond with symmetry. The economy slowly “boils”: costs rise without loud crises, but form a new reality of permanent queues in Moselle, Grand Est, Saxony–Brandenburg. The main risk is the imperceptible degradation of the single market and erosion of trust in EU institutions, becoming noticeable only at a crisis moment.
3. “Creeping dismantling”. Extensions of internal controls are signed “on autopilot” without the presence of a specific extraordinary threat; de facto borders return in central hubs. The Commission avoids tough infringement procedures, courts are overloaded with individual disputes, and legal uncertainty becomes the rule. Short-term political gain for governments turns into long-term productivity losses, higher prices, and slowed investment. In a few years, we approach the upper estimates of losses – up to the aforementioned €1.43 trillion (or more) over a decade – with the side effect of “renationalisation” of policy to the detriment of joint decisions.

What to do now: an expanded policy mix

First, stop the “automatic” extensions. A mandatory public dashboard of internal controls by country, section, and duration is needed, with a brief analysis of security results and economic cost. For Berlin – formalised proportionality criteria with mandatory consideration of border agglomerations (Moselle, Rhine, Lusatia) and quarterly review; implementation horizon – three months, responsible – Interior/Foreign Ministries in coordination with the Commission.

Second, finalise EES/ETIAS and police data exchange. Biometric entry/exit recording, validation of 90-day stays, and pre-screening for visa-free travel must be operational before the 2026 tourist season is scaled up. In parallel – interoperability of police databases (SIS, Prüm II) to prevent duplicate checks on internal sections. Success criteria – reduction of false positives at the external perimeter and absence of “manual” barriers inside.

Third, offset “pain points” during the transition period. Temporary “green lanes” for commuters and critical cargo, joint checkpoints at bilateral crossings, digital queues with guaranteed arrival times. In other words, buy time for people and businesses while the major system overhaul is underway. At the local level – “15-minute corridors” for commuting with a fixed maximum permissible average wait on weekdays.

Fourth, talk to the voter in the language of data. Every month of internal checks must have a public price tag in hours of delay and euros – with transparent attribution: where, why, how much security effect it delivered (very important) and what the economic cost was (even more important). Where the security effect is minimal and the cost high, policy must change quickly and publicly.

The bottom line is simple. The Schengen economy is a network of small decisions by millions of people and thousands of businesses, which works only under conditions of economic predictability and strategic security of the continent.

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