Serhiy Lyamets: Support for the Armed Forces as a "Hamburg account" for business

Journalist and blogger Serhiy Lyamets analyzes the situation with the treatment of property confiscated from representatives of the aggressor country.

It is very good that Ukraine is seizing the property of Russian oligarchs in Ukraine. Sberbank, VTB, Ocean Plaza, Aeroc, Mykolaiv Alumina Plant, Zaporizhzhia Aluminum Production Plant, Vukhatyi Nan - this is not a complete list of what was seized or nationalized. I only have a special opinion about Sense Bank, but the general trend is definitely correct. Russian assets should compensate Ukraine for Russian aggression.

Gradually, the assets are seized and accumulated. Currently, they are transferred mainly to the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA). The ARMA is, of course, a cesspool of corruption. But this is a whole other story. I am talking about the seizure mechanism itself.

What is happening now is a huge difference compared to what happened under Petro Poroshenko. It seemed that war was separate and business was separate. Russians felt untouchable in Ukraine. Sometimes they did not even hide; sometimes they used hybrid methods to disguise their presence in Ukraine. For example, rebranding or transferring assets to front companies - Ukrainian and foreign (in particular, Pavlo Fuks was considered to be such a person). After 2014, virtually all large Russian financial and industrial groups were able to stay and "settle down." Even those closest to the Kremlin, such as the Babakovs’ clan, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Deripaska, felt relatively free.

In addition to this, of course, Ukraine continued to trade with Russia even after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas. Rosneft fuel was imported to Ukraine through Medvedchuk, and Ukrainian titanium raw materials were shipped to Russia's VSMPO-AVISMA through "shell companies."

Even after the massacre in Bucha and the destruction of Mariupol, Russian oligarchs found ways to "do business" in Ukraine. This can be seen in the example of the Babakovs’ company who worked for almost a year without any problems and were given time to minimize the losses from nationalization. Of course, they did not make any contributions to the Armed Forces, did not help Ukrainian families left homeless - they simply received money from Ukraine and quietly "solved" issues with law enforcement.

The Russians' major assets have been seized, and a much more interesting stage has begun. Now the shares of Russian oligarchs in companies that have several owners are to be seized.

Many nuances are immediately apparent. From whom should assets be taken, and how much? How do you determine what is Russian and what is not? How do you identify those who are well hidden? And did they hide, or did it just seem that way to the Security Service, the State Bureau of Investigation, and the Prosecutor General’s Office?

There are still important questions. Should the shares of other owners be withdrawn as well? What if the shares are registered in the names of fictitious persons? How do you know who is pro-Russian and who is not?

The key question is how to prevent mediocre looting under the guise of national policy? There is much debate about what and how to nationalize. Isn't this process driven by a banal desire to take advantage of the situation to gain control of a profitable business through the ARMA? Or is it ultimately a simple desire to "rob" the owners by calling them pro-Russian.

I remember three situations that stand out from the rest.

The first is the sanctions on the gaming market, after which the Russians strangely continue to work. If you don't believe me, read Yevhen Plinskyi's posts.

The second is the case of IDS Ukraine, a producer of Morshynska water and other mineral waters. All of the company's shares were seized and transferred to the ARMA. Mikhail Friedman owned a stake in the company, but it also belonged to non-Russian owners whose shares were not to be withdrawn. However, they were seized. There are signs that this was an "order" from the competitor, Carpathian Mineral Waters. For example, a representative of the competitor company was put in charge of IDS Ukraine and the business survival is under threat.

The third is the situation around the Transinvestservis or TIS cargo ports in Odesa. TIS is a common brand under which several completely different terminals operate on the territory of Pivdennyi Port. They have the same name, but they belong to different people, and this happened long before the war started.

TIS-Zerno and TIS-Mindobryva are owned by Oleksii Fedorychev. Firstly, he is called a Russian oligarch because he does a lot of business in Russia. Second, he has never been a citizen of the Russian Federation. Third, the links to the Kremlin have not been proven.

Right next door, on the territory of the same Pivdennyi port, there are terminals owned by Ukrainians. These are TIS-Ruda, TIS-Vuhillia, TIS –Konteinernyi Terminal, TIS-14 Prychal, TIS-15 Prychal, and TIS-Infrastruktura. As you may have noticed, they are also TIS.

Attention, question: what should we do about it? Should we take away all the property that operates under the TIS sign? Should only part of it be taken away, or should it be taken away at all? These are the thoughts that have been circling in the minds of some security officials, and not only security officials, for many months now.

A few months ago, a representative of one of the agrarian oligarchs in the Verkhovna Rada said: “Why do Russians shoot at the ports of Odesa and Chornomorsk, but do not shoot at the port of Pivdennyi?” His answer was already ready: it was because the Pivdennyi port was linked to Russian oligarch Oleksii Fedorychev. He is currently under Ukrainian sanctions and is trying to prove in court that he is not a Russian. So, the activists hinted that the Russians are not shooting because it is their port.

Where is that "Hamburg account" that can distinguish a pro-Russian owner from a pro-Ukrainian one?

In my opinion, the marker today is the assistance to the Armed Forces. It is not only the fact of its existence that is important, but also its large scale. This is always a problem for the Russians, because they will have problems at home if they directly support the Ukrainian Armed Forces. That is why they are trying to substitute aid to the Ukrainian army with a certain surrogate, for example, "humanitarian aid" to IDPs. Or they are trying to "help just a little bit".

I have never heard of Fedorychev's assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Meanwhile, TIS-Zerno participated in the grain corridor. So, Fedorychev received money from Ukraine. He is not even sitting quietly, as most Russian oligarchs did. Fedorychev is suing Volodymyr Zelenskyy to have the sanctions lifted. It is like sitting on two chairs and behaving defiantly at the same time.

That is, the criterion for helping the Armed Forces is working. If you know of another, please suggest it. Of course, I propose that Fedorychev publicly declare his support for the Armed Forces and take certain steps. You do not even have to sponsor drones, but you can help with humanitarian aid, because you cannot sit on two chairs. Then, of course, the SSU should have taken this bold step into account.

In the meantime, we are watching the seizure of Russian oligarchs’ property in Ukraine.