Roman Holobutovskyy: Guarantees on Paper or in Reality? How to Safeguard NABU Detectives from Political Pressu

July 2025 became a point of tension for Ukraine’s entire anti-corruption system. The Verkhovna Rada adopted Draft Law No. 12414, subsequently signed by the President as Law No. 4555-IX. The act effectively subordinated the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) to the Office of the Prosecutor General, granting the Prosecutor General the authority to issue binding instructions to detectives, withdraw cases, and authorize notices of suspicion against high-ranking officials.

This amounted to a loss of institutional independence — the very rationale behind the establishment of Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure. The reaction was immediate: protests in Kyiv, statements from the European Union, and responses from international human rights organizations. Within a few days, Parliament passed a new presidential Draft Law No. 13533, which restored the autonomy of NABU and SAPO but introduced alternative oversight mechanisms — annual polygraph examinations and screening for ties with the aggressor state.

Formally, these measures strengthened trust in the institutions. Yet the central question remains: to what extent are those investigating cases against Ukraine’s political and business elite genuinely protected?

What the Law Guarantees

The Law "On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine" establishes fundamental provisions: the independence of the Bureau, a special procedure for appointing the Director, competitive selection of detectives, and financial and social guarantees. While performing their duties, detectives hold the status of representatives of the State. Their residence and personal data are protected, and searches or arrests involving them must be conducted with the support of a special operations unit.

Social protection includes compensation in the event of death or injury, as well as restitution of damages to family members. Additionally, the Law "On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers" provides for personal security measures, relocation, issuance of firearms, changes of personal documents, or even alteration of appearance.

On paper, the system appears comprehensive. In practice, however, detectives investigating high-level corruption remain vulnerable to political pressure, media attacks, and physical threats.

How Protection Works Abroad

• United States. Any assault or threat against a federal agent constitutes a distinct criminal offense, punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment. The law also extends protection to the families of law enforcement officers and to whistleblowers, creating a powerful preventive barrier.
• Italy. Following the assassinations of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992, the Central Protection Service (UCIS) was established — an inter-agency body that determines the level of protection for judges and prosecutors. From armored vehicles to relocation, the scope of protection equals that afforded to top state officials.
• Romania. The National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) operates under the oversight of the Superior Council of Magistracy, which manages appointments and disciplinary procedures, reducing political interference. Physical protection is provided by police and gendarmerie, but the core safeguard lies in procedural independence.
• South Korea. In 2021, the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) was created. It is not subordinated to the Government or the Prosecutor’s Office but reports directly to Parliament, minimizing political pressure.

In each of these models, the emphasis is not merely on formal guarantees but on tangible mechanisms: independent protection bodies, criminalization of pressure, and automatic provision of security in strategically significant cases.

What Ukrainian Detectives Lack

Ukrainian legislation provides a framework, but it does not resolve the most crucial issue — how to ensure that politicians and law enforcement agencies cannot turn the system against NABU. Based on international experience, several gaps are evident:

1. Independent Protection Authority. Current safeguards rely on NABU’s internal units or other law enforcement agencies, both of which may be susceptible to political influence. The Italian UCIS model illustrates the effectiveness of a specialized, independent protection body, which Ukraine could establish under the High Council of Justice or an independent commission with international participation.
2. Criminalization of Pressure. Ukrainian law criminalizes obstruction of law enforcement but lacks provisions specific to NABU detectives. A distinct offense covering threats, coercion, blackmail, disclosure of confidential data, or bribery attempts should be codified, with penalties including actual imprisonment for both private individuals and public officials.
3. Whistleblower Protection Within NABU. Detectives need secure mechanisms for reporting internal pressure or abuse. A dedicated internal protocol should guarantee anonymity, immunity from dismissal or disciplinary measures, and the right to address an independent authority.
4. Automatic Protection in Strategic Cases. In investigations involving defense, procurement, or large-scale contracts, security measures should be activated automatically, with pre-defined criteria to prevent misuse and budgetary strain.
5. Protection Against Political Purges. Changes in government must not lead to reprisals against detectives handling politically sensitive cases. Dismissals should be decided solely by an independent council.
6. Specialized Judicial Chamber. Procedural abuse via excessive recusals, complaints, and lawsuits can paralyze investigations. A specialized chamber with a small panel of independent judges should resolve complaints against detectives’ actions within strict time limits.
7. Long-Term Post-Service Guarantees. Retraining programs, state insurance, and protection for former detectives — who remain targets long after leaving office — are essential.

Ukraine already possesses legislation that formally guarantees the protection of anti-corruption detectives. Yet formal guarantees alone do not shield them from political interference or physical threats. International practice demonstrates that effective safeguards require independent institutions, automatic protection in strategic cases, strict criminalization of pressure, and long-term social guarantees.

Unless the State provides these mechanisms, NABU will remain vulnerable, and the broader anti-corruption system fragile. Only by creating real — rather than merely paper-based — protections can Ukraine demonstrate its genuine readiness to combat high-level corruption. Alongside institutional independence for NABU’s detectives and leadership, robust safeguards must exist to prevent the Bureau from being weaponized for political reprisals or business pressure. Otherwise, even the strongest anti-corruption body risks transforming from a guarantor of justice into a lever in someone else’s hands.

Roman Holobutovskyy, Judge of the Dnipropetrovsk District Administrative Court, Doctor of Law, Professor at Dnipropetrovsk State University of Internal Affairs